A Note from the Editor-in-Chief regarding the publication of the first issue of the Amherst College Law Review.
Vrinda Vinayak National Law University Delhi Introduction The recent hanging…Read More
Vanshaj Ravi Jain National Law School of India University Introduction…Read More
Rahul Bajaj and Devarshi Mukhopadhyay Nagpur University – NALSAR University…Read More
It is the endeavor of the authors, therefore, to explain the creation of a legal basis for shaping intellectual property discourse through the eyes of human rights law. In addition to exploring the legal and societal ramifications of this relationship, the authors shall also analyze the connections and divergences between these two sets of rights as part of the larger objective of this paper.
Mexican immigration surged in the early 20th century, spurred by violence from the Mexican Revolution and prosperity in the United States. Official census numbers count a tripling in the U.S. population from 200,000 Mexican immigrants in 1910 to 600,000 in 1930, but given the long and porous border between the two countries, the actual number was probably far larger. Many demographers and historians conclude that roughly 10 percent of Mexico’s population resided in the United States by 1930.
The introduction of FRAND licensing has created a whirlwind in patent regimes all over the globe. The ambivalence created by FRAND-encumbered SEP licenses has assumed a geo-economic color as Standard Setting Organizations, patent-holders and the users of the inventions have all become equal stakeholders.
The recent hanging of the 1993 Bombay blasts convict Yakub Memon has fanned the already raging debate regarding capital punishment in India. In this case, the doctrine of “rarest of rare” was applied yet again, in a quest to satisfy the collective conscience of Indian society. The phrase “rarest of rare” comes from a judgement of the Supreme Court of India in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2 S.C.C. 684 (1980), where the constitutionality of the death penalty was called into question due to the obfuscation in its implementation. The constitutionality of the death penalty was upheld, but its application was restricted to the “rarest of rare” cases to curtail arbitrariness in application.
Much has been said on the subject of Geographical Indications (GIs) and trademarks, and the turbulent relationship between these two ‘quibbling siblings’. The ‘conflict’ between the two is often premised on their conceptual similarity – that both GIs and trademarks are simply different means of enabling consumers to distinguish between goods through symbols that indicate a product’s quality. While GIs seek to do this by using a symbol that links the product to a territory that is reputed for those goods, trademarks use symbols that link the product to an undertaking’s reputation and history. As a consequence, when a particular word is claimed for protection by both GIs and trademark, there arises a contest of priority – which of the two ought to be permitted exclusive use of this word?
In this paper, building on the Brechtian notion of theatre, and extrapolating it to films, I seek to find what brings out subjectivity in a film, but restrict the scope of study to the legal genre. In pursuance, I shall discuss how an idea is delivered to the spectator through various tools used by the filmmaker, which will constitute the first part of the paper. Next, I shall discuss how the spectator may, in turn, respond to what the filmmaker offers her. This could be in the nature of assuming rationales for certain occurrences, motives of a character, or picking sides. This part will deal with why spectators respond differently, or expect different things from the same film, especially in the case of legal films. After analyzing the dialectic relationship between the filmmaker and the spectator, I will argue that subjectivity cannot be portrayed without the use of a spectator and question whether subjectivity can even be ‘portrayed’ itself.
The list of articles, authors, as well as staff who worked on this issue.